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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Intelligenz und Wille. Von Dr. E. MEUMANN. Zweite umgearbeitete u. vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer, 1913.—pp. viii, 361.

The second edition of this book shows no very important changes from the first. The two longest additions contain, the one a fuller and more explicit rejection of the doctrine that feelings have primary importance for the will, the other a discussion of the various cases where volition fails to be carried out, and of the relation between general and special volitions. The chief importance of the book, in the second as in the first edition, is as a contribution to individual psychology.

The first section deals with intelligence, defining it as the capacity to think or judge, and discusses the formal conditions of intelligence, the types of intelligence based on characteristic differences in attention type, and the relation of intelligence to observation, memory, and imagination. The relation of imagination to thought is of course a point needing especially careful elucidation. In thought, Meumann holds, the imageable or *anschaulich* elements are only means to an end: in imagination they are ends in themselves. Thought involves a search for relations. Both thought and imagination recombine ideas, but the former produces new relation-complexes, the latter new content-complexes. By thought we form concepts, which cannot be represented as images. Since, however, they must have *feste Anhaltspunkte*, we have need of words, gestures, and other symbols for thought: hence thought is essentially a symbolizing activity, while imagination is not. Both thought and imagination are ruled by *Aufgaben* or directing ideas, but these are of different sorts in the two cases. At this point in the exposition, the introduction in the second edition of a criticism of Ach's views on the nature of thought seems to involve the author in what is at least an obscurity, if it is not a contradiction. On one page he says of the Aufgabe and its accompaniments, "Alles das fehlt bei dem rein erinnerenden Vorstellen," as contrasted with imagination and thought. On the next page, in the new section, he criticises Ach as follows: "Das Aufgabebewusstsein, die 'determinierende Tendenz,' die Selektion der Vorstellungen unter dem Einfluss der Aufgabe u. a. m. sind gar keine dem Denken und Urteilen allein eigentlichen Vorgängen: sie kommen auch bei reinen Gedächtnisakten vor"; in which statement, rather than in the first, he is of course correct.

The second section, on the will, defends the following principal positions. The essential features of a truly voluntary act consist in an inner assent to its motives, and the consciousness that this inner assent is the real cause of the action. The movement idea is not of prime importance to the voluntary act. Of the several arguments which Meumann urges against such a supposition, the following are the most important. First, the movement idea cannot be concerned in inner volitions; second, children perform voluntary movements before they are capable of reproducing ideas; thirdly, movement ideas are very difficult to get, kinaesthetic complexes not being readily reproducible. The author grants, however, that movement ideas serve for the regulation of new movements, although not for their production. Precisely this function of regulation, we may note, is too important to be so cavalierly treated. It may also be said in criticism of the author's position, that the difficulty of calling into consciousness a kinaesthetic idea whose components can all be identified and localized does not disprove the functioning of kinaesthetic ideas in governing movements, any more than the difficulty of representing concepts under the form of images needs to prevent Meumann from admitting their function in thought.

Ach's theory of the will the author would accept if to the operation of determining tendencies as causes of volition there is added the 'inner consent.' Meumann's decided minimizing of the influence of feelings on the will seems to be connected with his narrow conception of feeling as mere pleasantness-unpleasantness. There are three kinds of will-acts, he says, where feeling certainly plays no part: habitual acts, compulsory acts, and acts proceeding from deliberation and intellectual conviction of the value of an end. Many psychologists, however, would broaden the term feeling to include precisely the various values which may attach to ends, and would urge that in habitual and compulsory actions the feeling element is still present, although its source is no longer the idea of the end.

The carrying out of volition into action Meumann believes to rest upon a purely associative process. The volition produces the act because motive and act have been previously associated. This association, of which a motor process is the second term, is in no way different from an association in the ordinary sense: "we have no reason to assume that the association of sensory and motor innervation processes is based on other conditions than those of sensory and sensory or of motor and motor processes." The most important cause of failure to carry out volition into action is thus any imperfection in the associative connection between the two, due for instance to lack of practice or lack of definiteness in the idea of the end.

The chapter on "Individual Forms of Will and Character" is one of the most valuable in the book. Of pure will-forms, the author contrasts the following pairs: the energetic and the non-energetic; the enduring and the fatigable; the systematic (governed by general purposes) and the atomistic; the will having clearly realized ends and the more impulsive or instinctive will; the static (needing only one resolution) and the dynamic (needing repeated resolutions); the hesitating and the promptly decisive; the type with a strong habit-forming tendency and that with less inclination to remain in habitual grooves. Under the head of 'feeling forms of will,' a new classification of temperaments is given, on the basis of the quality, intensity, and duration of feelings, the speed and facility of the affective response, and the active or passive character of the pleasantness or unpleasantness involved. Finally, the 'intelligence forms of will' are enumerated as the type guided by imagination, that guided by thought; the productive, unproductive, and reproductive types of will, the independent and dependent wills, the analytic and synthetic wills.

In the last chapter, on the relation between intelligence and will, the primacy of the former is maintained. The second edition has added a criticism of Wundt for inconsistently having abandoned the doctrine of a unique will-element in his psychology, while continuing to uphold a voluntaristic metaphysics. The question as to the proper relation of intellectual and volitional elements in determining one's metaphysical attitude is answered by a strong, and to the reviewer welcome, plea against irrationalism.

It seems ungrateful to wish that a book which in its sane and practical discussions of the individual aspects of intelligence and will performs so useful a task, based this achievement on a yet deeper theoretical foundation. But one wants further light upon the nature of that 'inner assent' which is the essential feature of will; one wants to know more about the psychological character and physiological basis of those 'relations' and 'concepts' which are the peculiar material of thought processes. On the last page of the book we are told that the inner assent may be the revelation of 'an elementary active reaction of the self.' If it is to be explained by such categories, then they should be used throughout in place of psychophysical explanations. But we find that elsewhere in the book the relation of motive to act is referred to the working of the laws of association, that is, to psychophysical causes. The reviewer greatly wishes that Meumann had at least indicated the direction in which one may look for a purely psychophysical explanation of the essential features of will.

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Natural Law in Science and Philosophy. By ÉMILE BOUTROUX. Authorized Translation by FRED ROTHWELL. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. 218.

This is a series of lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1892–3, to the English translation of which Professor Boutroux has added a brief preface. The logical, mathematical, mechanical, physical, chemical, biological, psychological, and sociological laws are critically examined in successive chapters, and shown to be irreducible to common principles at present, and to deviate further and further from strict logical necessity. Determinism as a philosophical principle seems to be identified in Professor Boutroux's mind with logical necessity of a type that cannot be attained in formal logic itself, since even this contains elements that cannot be reduced to pure thought. With such a conception of determinism assured, it is easy for Professor Boutroux to show that in the present development of the sciences its postulation is a sheer assumption. He concludes, "that which we call the laws of nature is the sum total of the methods we have discovered for adapting things to the mind, and subjecting them to be moulded by the will" (p. 217). "The mechanical laws of nature, revealed by modern science, form in reality the chain that binds the without to the within. Instead of being a necessity, they set us free" . . . (p. 218).